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Abstract
Many perceptual decision making models posit that participants accumulate noisy evidence over time to improve the
accuracy of their decisions, and that in free response tasks, participants respond when the accumulated evidence reaches a
decision threshold. Research on the neural correlates of these models’ components focuses primarily on evidence
accumulation. Far less attention has been paid to the neural correlates of decision thresholds, reflecting the final
commitment to a decision. Inspired by a model of bistable neural activity that implements a decision threshold, we
reinterpret human lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) as reflecting the crossing of a decision threshold. Interestingly, this
threshold crossing preserves signatures of a drift-diffusion process of evidence accumulation that feeds in to the threshold
mechanism. We show that, as our model predicts, LRP amplitudes and growth rates recorded while participants performed
a motion discrimination task correlate with individual differences in behaviorally-estimated prior beliefs, decision thresholds
and evidence accumulation rates. As such LRPs provide a useful measure to test dynamical models of both evidence
accumulation and decision commitment processes non-invasively.
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Introduction
Decision making has traditionally been described as a process of
evidence accumulation up to an abstract decision threshold, in
which accumulation over time increases the chance of an accurate
response (e.g., [1]). Here we focus on a mechanism for
implementing this decision threshold in a neurally-plausible
network, and the predictions that makes for neural activity [2,3].
We then show that these predictions are satisfied by the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP), a difference wave between centrally
located scalp potentials that routinely accompanies manual
responding. Paradoxically, this emphasis on decision threshold
activity turns out to provide a useful methodological approach to
studying the evidence accumulation process thought to precede
decision threshold-crossing.
A canonical evidence accumulation model for response-time
tasks is the drift diffusion model (DDM; [4]). In the DDM, the
presentation of a stimulus drives a noisy evidence-accumulation
process until it reaches one of two decision thresholds. Participants
emit the response corresponding to the threshold reached. The
quality of perceptual information determines the speed of
accumulation (drift) relative to the intensity of background noise
(diffusion). The noisiness of the process accounts for across-trial
variability in response times (RTs) and accuracy. Differences in the
height of the decision threshold determine speed-accuracy trade-
offs (SATs): an increase in threshold height emphasizes accuracy
over speed. A participant’s accuracy is determined by which of the
decision thresholds is reached first. His/her response time (RT) is
determined by the time it takes to reach this decision threshold,
plus the time taken for non-decision processes (e.g., perceptual and
motor delays).
Recent efforts have focused on finding neural correlates of the
process of evidence accumulation in perceptual decision making
with monkey neurophysiology (e.g., [5–7]), human magnetoen-
cephalography (e.g., [8,9]), functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI; e.g., [10]) and electroencephalography (EEG; e.g., [11–
13]). Although neural correlates of decision thresholds and
changes in their height have been extensively studied [14–17],
decision making research typically treats the crossing of a decision
threshold abstractly. In other words, it is unclear how the system
moves from decision-preparation/evidence accumulation (OFF)
instantaneously to decision-commitment (ON) [18]. In the
preparation state, the system sends virtually zero input to the
motor system until evidence builds to a critical level, at which
point a punctate transition into the decision-commitment state
occurs, possibly accompanied by an almost immediate muscular
contraction [19]. Consequently most decision making models
implicitly assume that the decision system is capable of
implementing a non-linear step function that switches from OFF
to ON when evidence exceeds some critical level. Subcortical
structures are good candidates for such punctate transitions
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[20,21] but what if the transition is not in fact punctate, but is
instead a relatively gradual process in its own right? Would cortical
populations with the same properties (i.e., time constants) as
cortical accumulators be able to implement such a threshold
mechanism, or must such mechanisms be relegated to subcortical
structures such as the basal ganglia?
To address this question, we used a multi-layer neural network
model that explicitly describes how accumulated evidence is
transformed into a motor response [2,3]. We previously hypoth-
esized that the threshold layer of this model was associated with
premotor cortex. Since this is the primary source of the LRP that
can be measured with scalp EEG, our objective was to examine
whether changes in LRP shape and amplitude across task
conditions support and confirm the qualitative predictions of our
model. If so, this would lend support to a model of cortical decision
commitment.
Specification of the multi-layer decision model
The circuit model that describes the complete process of
evidence accumulation and motor implementation [2,3] is based
on a simplified representation of firing-rate activity in a cortical
neural population (cf. [22,23]). We do not explicitly model how
this population-level activity translates into macroscopically
observable EEG activity via forward modeling with a skull and
scalp model since we do not have enough physical information to
justify this approach. We rather propose a qualitative mapping in
which increases and decreases in model activity are reflected in
similar changes in the across-trial average of event-locked EEG
signals, the event-related potential (ERP). Under this representa-
tion, neural populations typically act as leaky integrators of the
activity of their input populations.
A more detailed model description, including equations, can be
found in File S1. Simply, the model makes use of the fact that
recurrent units can be configured such that they have exactly two
stable states, reflecting the two states of decision preparation and
commitment. These are exactly the same units that can be
configured to work as integrators when the recurrent connections
are weak enough.
Activation profiles of threshold detectors
Putting together these bistable units with integrator units, Simen
and Cohen (2009) [2] created a model for two-alternative forced
choices. This model consisted first of an evidence accumulation
layer consisting of two leaky competing accumulators (cf. [24]),
each of which accumulates evidence in favor of one of two
competing response options. Mounting evidence suggests that
evidence accumulation is mediated by a large variety of brain
areas, such as parietal cortex (e.g., [5]), dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex [25,26], frontal eye field–FEF [27,28], caudate [29], and
superior colliculus [30]. We therefore depict evidence accumula-
tion in somewhat posterior, bilateral electrode locations, where
evidence for, say, a left button press is integrated in the
accumulation layer in the right hemisphere (blue) and evidence
for a right button press is similarly integrated in the left
hemisphere (red). The middle panel of Figure 1A shows the
activation of each accumulator unit over time; the right panel of
Figure 1A plots the difference between these activations. This
difference approximates a drift-diffusion process when the
leakiness of the accumulators is balanced by reciprocal, lateral
inhibition between them [31].
The second layer (Figure 1B; blue shading) is the threshold layer
that consists of the bistable switch units described above, which
detect when activity in either of the corresponding accumulation
layer units has exceeded a critical value. The threshold units are
leaky integrators with strongly positive, recurrent feedback. This
positive feedback causes the units to produce nearly binary outputs
which can remain relatively quiescent for a broad range of inputs
up to one critical value, at which point they quickly become
maximally activated and remain so even for modest fluctuations in
their input (see, e.g., [22,23]).
The middle panel of figure 1B shows threshold-unit activations
and the right panel of Figure 1B shows their difference over time.
Threshold units track the accumulation units in the period prior to
the stereotyped peak. The pre-stimulus level and the rate of
increase of threshold-unit activity after stimulus onset can be
modulated by biasing signals sent to the threshold units. These
signals can adapt SAT and response-bias settings to take
advantage of changes in task conditions that affect reward rate
[32].
Finally, like the threshold layer, the response layer (Figure 1C)
consists of interconnected, bistable switch units that implement a
‘reset’ signal. They activate at the time of a response and, in
addition to triggering movement, provide feedback inhibition that
drives down the accumulator and threshold unit activations in
preparation for the next decision.
While there have been many studies of the neural correlates of
evidence accumulation and motor responses, very little is known
about the neural correlates of the process that connects these two:
threshold crossing (but see [13]). We propose that the dynamics of
the threshold layer may be reflected in LRP activity. This is in
contrast to previous work, which has suggested that either the LRP
reflects something akin to our evidence accumulation layer [33], or
something more akin to our response layer [34,35]. Because
neither of these views has been conclusive, we propose a
perspective that could reconcile them. Since the threshold layer
lies between the response and accumulation layers, it has both a
continuous and a ballistic component to its dynamics. The gradual
aspect is in agreement with Spencer & Coles’ conception [33],
while the ballistic aspect is in agreement with Rinkenauer et al.’s
conception [35]. Note that we expect only a qualitative match
between model-activations and LRPs, since each unit in our model
represents a population of neurons, and the model does not
contain detailed assumptions about brain anatomy and filtering of
neural activity by the skull.
In particular, we predict that the slow, early part of the LRP
should display correlations with the participants’ rate of evidence
accumulation, which can be conveniently estimated with a DDM
fit. This correlation with drift rate arises because changes in
threshold-unit activation depend strongly on the threshold unit’s
input (see Figure 1D). In other words, as drift varies, the difference
between preliminary activations across conditions forms the gray
area depicted in Figure 1D. Specifically, changes in drift should
produce a positive area between the LRP curves when the high-
drift LRP is subtracted from the low-drift LRP, and the size of this
area should be correlated with the difference in drift values
estimated from fits of the DDM to RT and accuracy data. We
focus on the area between curves rather than rate of rise of the
function because the area between curves is much less sensitive to
artifactual fluctuations in the EEG data [36].
This account makes a further prediction. Very high levels of
drift can cause an overshoot phenomenon, in which the threshold
unit activation rises to a higher maximum before resetting, relative
to lower-drift conditions (see Figure 1E). As a result, the peak of
the LRP moves in position, and shifts closer to the time of the
response for very high drift rates. This peak-location prediction is
interesting because although it has been observed in the LRP
literature [35], we are unaware of any widely accepted account of
it.
LRP and Threshold Crossing
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Figure 1. Neural network implementation of the DDM and associated LRP predictions. The neural network model of decision making
consists of three layers (units with S-shaped curves denote bistable switch units). In the evidence accumulation layer (A), located potentially in
parietal cortex, activity increases with motion input over time (red= leftward motion; blue= rightward motion). The difference in left minus right
activations approximates a drift-diffusion process. This accumulation layer feeds into the threshold layer (B), which is potentially located in primary
motor cortex. The difference between left and right switch unit activations then reflects the LRP signal. The threshold layer’s output is transformed
into a punctate motor output in the response layer (A), which also ensures that the threshold and accumulation layers are reset after the response. (D)
Our model predicts that for changes in signal-to-noise ratio, in the accumulation layer the slope of neural activity changes, while in the threshold
layer there is a non-linear change in slope. Consequently, the change due to increases in signal-to-noise ratio is best quantified by the area between
curves. (E) Additionally, the model predicts that the magnitude and location of the response-locked simulated LRP should vary with signal-to-noise
ratio (pink = low drift;green=high drift). (F) When varying response bias, the model predicts that the height of the LRP should change (pink = low
bias;green=high bias).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.g001
LRP and Threshold Crossing
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In contrast to the slow early part of the LRP, the fast,
stereotyped part of the LRP should depend mostly on the
threshold unit’s self-excitation properties. This means it should
exhibit a rapid ballistic increase once a critical value of input has
been surpassed. Changes in the magnitude of this ballistic
component (relative to baseline levels of activation) result primarily
from strategic biasing. This biasing changes response probabilities
prior to evidence accumulation by adding a continuous, biasing
increment to the accumulated evidence that otherwise constitutes
the threshold unit’s input; this biasing in turn elevates initial
activation levels. Figure 1F shows three different levels of response
bias: for the pink plot, almost no additional bias is added; for the
yellow, an intermediate level of input bias is added, with the result
that the pre-stimulus input level hovers to the right of zero. The
corresponding output level increases relative to the zero-bias case
but remains at the low-activation stable state. The green trace
shows the effect of a strong bias, which brings the activity of the
threshold unit close to its tipping point.
Empirically, changes in response bias should therefore affect the
baseline-to-peak height of the LRP. Hence, differences in LRP-
peak amplitude across bias conditions should be correlated with
differences in the estimated starting point parameter of the DDM.
We will test the predictions for signal-to-noise ratio and response
bias in two experiments.
Results
Experiment 1
Our first prediction concerns the effect of motion coherence on
the LRP. Stimulus coherence affects the speed of evidence
accumulation in the model (see Figure 1D). This accumulation
rate is reflected in threshold layer activations primarily by the rise
time of the predicted LRP, resulting in a separation between the
curves for different coherence levels. As the difference between
stimulus coherences increases, the separation between these curves
should increase. Before testing this prediction experimentally, we
wanted to confirm that our manipulation of coherence was
successful. Figure 2 illustrates the coherences used for the two
difficulty levels (A) and the resulting behavioral data (B,C). As
expected, accuracy was lower [t(19)=18.0, pv0:001] and RT
was longer [t(19)=9.0, pv0:001] for the more difficult low-
coherence trials, which had a significantly lower coherence than
the high-coherence trials [t(19)=15.0, pv0:001].
We also used two control tasks to test whether putative
threshold-crossing activity reflected in the LRP from the dot-
motion task reflected evidence accumulation alone, or in contrast,
reflected only evidence-independent motor preparation. In these
tasks, participants were not required to integrate motion evidence
(non-integration tasks). In the signal detection control task, partici-
pants were instructed to press a pre-defined button (left or right), as
soon as any dot-stimuli appeared on the screen. These dot-stimuli
had 0% motion coherence. The task was designed to measure
participants’ signal detection RTs to the appearance of dot-stimuli.
These signal detection times were then used to create trials of the
second control task, the arrow task.
The arrow task was designed to be virtually identical to the dot-
motion discrimination task, with the exception of the evidence
accumulation process. As such, the arrows trials and dot-motion
trials, which were run in separate blocks, were matched in
perceptual and motor demands and average dot-motion viewing
time, but the arrows task required only brief, non-noisy evidence
accumulation on the part of the participant.
We fit the pure DDM to the behavioral data for each individual
participant separately with the Matlab Diffusion Model Analysis
Toolbox, DMAT [37,38]. We allowed the drift, starting point and
non-decision time (Ter) to vary between the low and high
coherence conditions, and restricted the variability parameters to
be zero. An unbiased starting point is half the magnitude of the
decision threshold parameter. Because there is evidence that
participants keep their decision thresholds constant when only drift
rate is experimentally manipulated [39], we kept thresholds fixed
across conditions during fitting. We also tried a model in which the
threshold varied between low- and high-coherence conditions,
which was a better model (lower Bayesian Information Criterion;
BIC) for 8/20 participants. A much more complex model in which
drift, threshold, non-decision time were all allowed to vary
between conditions and the various noise parameters were also
non-zero, was the best model (lowest BIC) for 4/20 participants.
We computed separate fits for the arrow and signal detection
trials. Following common practice, the noise coefficient in these fits
was constrained to be 0.1. Table 1 shows the mean fitted
parameters.
We next examined whether the LRPs showed evidence of
behavior similar to that of threshold units in our model. In
particular, the model predicts that, for simple signal detection
(which does not require evidence to be accumulated for a
discrimination), the activity should ramp up much more quickly
than for conditions requiring stimulus discrimination and the
integration of evidence (see green time course in Figure 1D).
Specifically, the LRP a few hundred milliseconds prior to the
ballistic deflection shows clear modulation with changes in the drift
rate. In Figure 3C, we compare the response-locked LRPs for trials
Figure 2. Behavioral performance in Experiment 1. Mean (sem) coherence (A), accuracy (B), and response time (C) across subjects for the low
and high coherence conditions. Coherences were tuned to ensure approximately 70 and 90% correct performance for each participant, and the two
conditions are statistically different from each other for all three measures (coherence, accuracy, and response time).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.g002
LRP and Threshold Crossing
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in which the participant had to integrate motion information to
trials in which s/he did not have to do so, because the correct
response was specified beforehand (red trace), or indicated with an
arrow after dot-motion onset (green trace). Arrow stimuli show a
steeper slope than the dot motion condition because their drift rate
is higher (t(19)=2.1, pv0:05; Table 1). This increased drift rate
also causes an LRP peak of the non-integration condition (arrows)
that is closer to the time of the response than the lower drift rate
integration condition (prediction: Figure 1E; experiment:
Figure 3C; Marrows =228 ms; Mintegration =292 ms;
t(19)=11.99, pv0:001).
We then compared the low- and high-coherence response-
locked LRPs, the early part of which we predicted would reflect
the DDM drift rate. Figure 3A shows that as predicted in
Figure 1D, these LRPs differ between low and high coherence in
the shaded pre-peak regime. Our model predicts that changing the
speed of evidence accumulation should change the shape of the
early part of the LRP, which reflects low but increasing levels of
input from the accumulator units. Closer to the response, the LRP
will look more stereotyped across conditions (see Figure 1D).
Consequently, the difference between drift estimates in each
motion coherence condition should correlate across subjects with
the area between their corresponding LRP curves in their rising
phase. It is important to examine the area between curves for the
early phase of the LRP, rather than the height of its peak, because
our model showed that this early phase is most sensitive to the
differences between conditions. We therefore examined whether
the area between the curves from 250 to 150 ms before the
response, during the LRP’s rising phase, reflected the difference
between the estimated DDM parameters for low and high
coherence (Figure 3B). Indeed, as the area between the low- and
high-coherence LRPs increases, the difference between the
estimates of the drift rate decreases [robust regression
t(19)~2:02, pv0:05].
We next examined whether we could use the response-locked
LRPs together with stimulus-locked LRPs to disentangle the
stimulus- and response components of the DDM’s non-decision
time parameter Ter. Ter models the combined effects of a
perceptual latency and a motor latency. The stimulus-locked
LRP shows a period near zero until it departs from baseline (see
Figures S4 and S5). We hypothesized that the time until the LRP
departs from baseline reflects the stimulus-processing latency, and
the time between the peak of the LRP and the response, the motor
latency. This follows from our conception of the LRP consisting of
two phases: the early, smoothly rising phase as reflecting evidence
accumulation, and the later, ballistic phase reflecting the
commitment to a decision and actual motor response. We defined
the time at which the LRP departed from the baseline as the
intersection of the initial horizontal part of the LRP with the rising
phase of the peak. Figure 3D shows that Ter estimated from the
LRP in this way correlates with the behaviorally-estimated Ter
[robust regression, t(39)~2:14, pv0:05]. Together, these results
suggest that the early, slowly rising phase of the LRP is consistent
with aspects of evidence accumulation that spread from the
accumulation layer of our model into its threshold layer.
One may, however, wonder whether the threshold layer of the
model is the best fit for the data, or whether alternatively the
accumulation layer better models the LRP. To address this
question, we computed the root-mean-square deviation (RMSD)
between the LRP waveform and the traces predicted by the model
(after scaling them to have the same height). For every set of
parameters, we then computed the goodness-of-fit between the
model-generated averages of its accumulation layer and its
threshold layer. The threshold layer showed a better fit (lower
RMSD) to the response-locked LRP than the accumulation layer
for 59% of the (plausible) parameter space. The plausible
parameter space spans those sets of parameters that lead to model
responses within the empirically observed response window.
Altogether, Experiment 1 suggests that LRPs exhibit charac-
teristics consistent with our modeled response threshold detectors,
which are implemented in bistable, neural switch populations.
More precisely, when response-locked, the area between the low-
and high-coherence LRPs predicts drift rates of evidence
accumulation. In addition, we can predict Ter by adding the time
to LRP onset to the time between the LRP peak and the actual
response. This demonstrates that the LRP may provide a useful
index of the average state of evidence accumulation within a trial,
despite its typical interpretation as a predominantly motor-related
phenomenon (but see [13]). It is also consistent with predictions
regarding SAT settings, which is the main phenomenon that the
threshold layer of our neural network model aims to describe.
Interestingly, inspection of Figure 3A reveals a notable feature
of the data: the LRP for signal detection trials appears to have a
smaller peak than the LRP in the conditions in which the response
is not known before the start of the trial (i.e., arrows and
integration trials). This suggests that the height of the response-
locked LRP may also reflect a participant’s response bias. When
threshold units receive a continuous biasing signal, as would be
appropriate in the signal detection case in which only one response
is required, they require less evidence input to reach the critical
level needed to emit a response. Their pre-stimulus baseline
activation levels are already partway toward the threshold for
responding. If threshold units are biased asymmetrically in a two-
choice context, then the attenuation of the LRP height should be
Table 1. Pure DDM parameters for best fitting model to data from Experiment 1.
Condition Drift Decision threshold Non-decision time Starting point Ntrials
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M
Low coh 0.060 0.008 0.151 0.013 0.435 0.013 0.076 0.005 614
High coh 0.172 0.008 - - 0.402 0.016 0.078 0.006 677
Arrows 0.803 0.076 0.214 0.041 0.219 0.010 0.098 0.031 1273
Signal detection 1.056 0.187 0.418 0.107 0.162 0.023 0.265 0.103 199
Data are presented separately for low and high coherence trials (integration conditions), and arrows and signal detection trials (non-integration conditions). The last
column indicates the average number of trials in each of the conditions. Parameters that do not vary between conditions are indicated with a dash (-). Our scaling of the
threshold parameter adheres to the Ratcliff convention according to which one of the decision thresholds is placed at zero, and the other decision threshold at the
value represented by the decision threshold parameter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.t001
LRP and Threshold Crossing
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proportional to the DDM’s behaviorally-estimated decision bias
parameter. Asymmetric biasing is in fact optimal in the two-choice
case of Experiment 2, as we describe below [31]. We test this
prediction of LRP-amplitude attenuation with increasing response
bias in Experiment 2. This is a crucial prediction to test, because
up to now, we have only verified the continuous aspect of the
threshold units–they reflect signatures of evidence accumulation.
The model’s ballistic aspect can be tested by examining response
bias, which should affect the LRP’s magnitude.
Figure 3. Response-locked LRPs and individual differences for Experiment 1. (A) Grand average response-locked LRP, demonstrating the
difference between low and high coherence conditions. Vertical lines indicate stimulus onsets for the respective conditions. Shaded area indicates the
time window where low and high-coherence differ significantly (t-test with p,0.05). Inset shows a topographical map (nose up) of lateralized EEG
activity, demonstrating that electrodes C3 and C4 are maxima of this measure. (B) Individual differences in DDM estimate of drift rate correlate with
area between curves of high- and low-coherence LRPs. Each dot reflects the difference between low- and high-coherence drift and area between LRP
curves for a single participant. (C) Grand average response-locked LRP demonstrating the difference between integration and non-integration
conditions. Blue trace reflects the evidence-integration condition (average of low- and high-coherence trials). Red reflects a task condition where the
participant has to press a pre-specified button, whereas green shows trials on which a participant is instructed by an arrow cue which button to press.
Vertical lines indicate dot-motion onsets for the respective conditions. (D) We estimated non-decision time Ter from the LRP by adding the time until
departure from baseline to the distance between LRP peak and the actual motor response. The thus-estimated neural Ter correlates with the
behaviorally-estimated Ter . Each dot reflects data from one participant in one condition (low or high coherence).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.g003
LRP and Threshold Crossing
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e90943
Experiment 2
To test the second prediction from our model—that the height
of the LRP peak reflects a participant’s decision bias, with a
smaller height indicating an increase in decision bias (Figure 1F)—
we conducted an experiment in which we manipulated stimulus
proportions to induce four distinct levels of decision bias. Simen et
al. [40] have previously shown that when the proportions of
leftward vs. rightward dot-motion stimuli make it more likely that
the dots will move in one of the two possible directions,
participants typically adapt to this change, as predicted by Bogacz
and colleagues [31], by shifting starting points and reducing
thresholds to achieve a nearly optimal response bias.
As expected, participants’ accuracies increase and their RTs
decrease across blocks as the stimulus proportions in a block
increasingly favor one of the two motion directions [see Figure 4;
repeated measures ANOVAs indicate that both accuracy and RT
vary with the level of response bias: Fs(3,99)w67:4, pv0:001], in
agreement with previous results [40]. We also note that DDM
parameter estimates are sensitive to the different bias-level
conditions (Table 2). Given these fits, Figure 4C shows that
behavioral estimates of decision bias (as captured by changes in the
starting point) increase with the bias condition, as predicted for
optimal responding [31].
Figure 5A shows a grand average response-locked LRP split by
bias condition. The height of the LRP decreased with decision bias
[one-way repeated measures ANOVA with response bias proba-
bility as continuous variable F (1,49)=25.4, pv0:001]. We next
asked whether decreases in peak height within participants
correlated with individual differences in the behaviorally-estimated
response bias. When we subtracted peak height from the height of
the LRP in the unbiased condition, there was a significant relation
between this normalized LRP height and behaviorally-estimated
DDM starting points [t-test on individual participant slopes of
LRP height on starting-point estimate t(24)=5.74, pv0:001; see
Figure 5B].
If the height of the LRP reflects the distance from threshold,
which decreases with response bias, then this also predicts that the
LRPs for the trials in which the stimuli move in the direction
opposite to the bias direction (‘‘non-preferred’’) should have a
higher amplitude. Figure 5C shows that indeed this is the case
[paired t-test on areas between the preferred and non-preferred
curves between 2150 and 250 ms: t(99)=11.4, pv0:001]. In
short, the dynamics of the LRP are also consistent with our
model’s predictions for manipulations of response bias.
Discussion
There is a substantial literature on the neural basis of the
integrators that correspond to the accumulation layer of the model
(Figure 1A). In contrast, thresholds play a critical role in nearly all
decision making models–allowing levels of evidence (or urgency, or
preference) to rise and fall during deliberation without any
concomitant bodily movement prior to decision commitment. Yet,
the mechanisms underlying threshold operation have received far
less attention than the mechanisms underlying evidence accumu-
lation [18]. We have therefore focused on finding non-invasive,
high temporal resolution signatures of a neural threshold
mechanism in the context of a three-stage neural network model
of the decision process that specifies a neurally-plausible mecha-
nism for crossing the decision threshold.
We have shown that LRPs may reflect the operation of such
mechanisms. We found that LRP dynamics are consistent with the
dynamics predicted by our model’s threshold layer. In particular,
the early non-ballistic LRP component’s behavior reflected signal-
to-noise ratio. The LRP’s shape was more consistent with
activation levels in the threshold layer of our neural network
model than with those in the accumulation layer. We also found
that neural correlates of Ter (non-decision time) were correlated
with behavioral estimates of Ter. The magnitude of the ballistic
part of the LRP (peak height) was consistent with predictions
concerning response bias.
Peak shifting
Beyond these basic predictions of the model, we have given a
model-based account of LRP peak-shifting between integration
(motion-detection) and non-integration (arrows/signal detection)
conditions of our task. Previous studies [41–44] have not produced
a clear picture of which task conditions cause a shift in LRP peak.
We have demonstrated that the LRP peak moves closer to the
response when there is a very high drift rate, and the threshold
unit rises to a maximum before resetting (Figure 1E). However, in
addition to our account, elements of these other accounts may also
contribute to peak shifting. For example, when the evidence is less
noisy (in the non-integration trials), it may produce more rapid
and ballistic post-decision motor processing because the partici-
pant may allow less continuous checking of the to-be-emitted
response [45].
Figure 4. Behavioral data for Experiment 2. Mean accuracy (A) and reaction time (B) as a function of response bias condition. (C). Fitted DDM
starting point increases with response bias condition. Response bias condition is operationalized as the proportion of trials in biased direction. Error
bars reflect sem.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.g004
LRP and Threshold Crossing
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e90943
Table 2. DDM parameters for best fitting model to data from Experiment 2.
condition Drift Decision threshold Non-decision time Starting point Ntrials
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M
0.50/0.50 0.0952 0.006 0.137 0.006 0.289 0.022 0.0613 0.003 869
0.60/0.40 - - - - - - 0.0616 0.003 863
0.75/0.25 - - - - - - 0.0689 0.003 880
0.90/0.10 - - - - - - 0.0889 0.004 935
Fits were done separately for each of the response bias conditions. Only the starting point is allowed to vary between the different conditions. Parameters that do not
vary between conditions are indicated with a dash (-). Last column indicates the number of trials in each condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.t002
Figure 5. Response-locked LRPs in Experiment 2. (A) Grand average LRP waveform separated by response bias (cf. Figure 1F). (B) Relationship
between normalized LRP peak height and fitted DDM response bias. There is a significant correlation between the DDM starting-point parameter and
LRP height. Error bars reflect sem. (C) Grand average response-locked LRPs in Experiment 2 separately for the preferred (solid) and non-preferred
(dashed) direction. As predicted by our model, the LRP is larger for the non-preferred compared to the preferred direction [t(99)= 11.4, pv0:001].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090943.g005
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Does the LRP reflect evidence accumulation or threshold
crossing?
Historically, the LRP has played an important role in debates
about the nature and timing of mental processing (e.g.,
[35,46,47]). In the context of decision making, for example,
Spencer & Coles (1999) [33] showed that the LRP recordings of
Gratton et al (1988) [46] qualitatively matched the activity of
evidence accumulator units in a neural network model of the
flanker task [48], at least during the non-ballistic phase of the LRP.
Rinkenauer et al (2004) [35] focused on the LRP as a signature of
SAT adaptation, but argued that their data were inconsistent with
models of evidence accumulation. We propose that the early part
of the LRP does reflect evidence accumulation (and therefore
correlates with individual differences in DDM parameters),
whereas variations in the later, ballistic part, on which Rinkenauer
and colleagues focus, reflect primarily the adaptation of SAT.
According to our model, the slowly rising phase of the LRP results
from the sub-threshold input to the threshold units by the
accumulator units. Once threshold unit activity crosses a critical
level, it rises very quickly to a maximum, which accounts for the
ballistic phase of the LRP. Our proposal is similar to that of Kelly
& O’Connell [49], who recently showed that the LRP occurred at
a later point in time than a putative correlate of evidence
accumulation (in their account, the centroparietal positive
potential).
Fixed vs. modifiable thresholds
Evidence for threshold mechanisms in neural activity is
abundant, and adapting thresholds to change SATs is a classic
element of psychological decision making models [1]. However,
the degree to which thresholds are modifiable is disputed on the
basis of physiological evidence. Purcell et al. (2010) [28], for
example, examine ramping response-locked FEF movement/
buildup neuron activity in monkeys responding to visual stimuli
with saccadic eye movements. Although movement neurons in the
FEF are arguably at a neural level analogous to our threshold
layer, they model this activity as a process of gated evidence
accumulation our accumulation layer), in which evidence accu-
mulation begins only after a threshold level of input from a sensory
detector (visual neurons in FEF) is received. RTs are determined
by the time at which evidence exceeds a second, fixed, response
threshold, and the slope of this evidence is a key determinant of
RT, although in their work the ramp-up period typically occupies
a small proportion of the total RT.
This work by Purcell, Schall and colleagues adds to a body of
physiological data that appears to provide evidence against the
notion of easily modifiable response thresholds. FEF activity in
experiments such as [28,50] typically ramps to the same level
regardless of RT. In our Experiment 2, we have interpreted our
data in precisely the opposite terms, with biasing activity
hypothesized to modify the level to which evidence should
accumulate before triggering a response (by supplementing the
evidence inputs to the threshold units). This is also consistent with
recent work by Heitz & Schall (2012) [51], who demonstrated
there were neurons in motor cortex (recorded during a visual
search task) that had a different final firing rate depending on the
level of their SAT. It should, however, be noted that they found
several other signatures of SAT adaptations as well.
Some evidence suggests that instead of thresholds themselves, it
is the initial firing rate at which putative accumulators begin to
accumulate evidence that effects a change in response biases [52].
This type of dynamics might also account for our LRP data, but it
would require biasing the accumulator layer of our model rather
than the threshold layer (see e.g., [53,54]). To still approximate
optimal evidence accumulation in such a model, the biasing signal
would need to be disabled at the start of each accumulation [31].
Our model of the threshold layer provides another, possibly
simpler way to resolve the conflict between behavioral evidence for
threshold adaptability and optimal evidence accumulation versus
physiological evidence for fixed response thresholds. If putative
FEF evidence accumulators in Purcell et al. [28] are instead
reinterpreted as threshold-crossing detectors, then the signatures of
evidence accumulation they display can be understood as the
echoes of evidence accumulation taking place in other brain areas
that project to FEF — areas in which accumulators may in fact
ramp to different levels of activity before triggering transitions
from an FEF switch’s down state to its up state.
The reason that the neural data are often taken to support fixed
thresholds is that adjustable thresholds are difficult to observe in
neural data. A simple modification of our model illustrates why
this is the case. Adjustable decision thresholds might be obscured
by neurally plausible excitatory feedback connections from the
threshold layer to the accumulator layer. These would force the
accumulators up to the same level for all decisions, following the
stereotyped behavior of the threshold units. Hence, indications
that a given brain area plays a role in evidence accumulation
should focus on the earliest levels of neural processing at which
ramping can be observed (see [3] for more details).
Non-decision time
In our study, we observed a relation between LRP peaks and
behavioral non-decision time (Ter; Figure 3D). The slope of this
relationship was smaller than one, such that the neurally-estimated
Ter underestimates the behaviorally-estimated Ter. It is therefore
likely that in addition to the perceptual and motor processes that
we estimate from the LRP, there is at least one other process that
contributes to Ter. An alternative possibility is that the small slope
is caused by the fact that the 1DF method that we use to determine
the LRP-based estimate of Ter is biased towards finding shorter
Ter estimates, because the earliest above-baseline fluctuation will
determine Ter. As a result, the slope between behaviorally- and
LRP-estimated Ter will tend to be smaller than one, as we
observed.
Effects of bias
The outcome of our bias manipulation is consistent with the
results of previous LRP studies that did not explicitly investigate
connections to the DDM. Jentsch and Sommer (2002) [55] saw
shallower LRPs for repeat- compared to alternation trials, and it is
plausible that repeat trials create a decision bias (e.g., [56,57]).
To¨llner and colleagues [58] similarly showed that, relative to the
preceding choice, a different response in a visual search task has a
larger amplitude than the same response. Scheibe and colleagues
[59] showed a larger LRP amplitude for invalidly cued compared
to validly cued trials. A cue will make a response in the cued
direction more likely, which, in a DDM framework, would be
modeled by moving the starting point closer to the relevant
decision threshold on those trials [59]. did not observe an effect of
explicitly manipulated prior probability of a response on LRP
amplitude, although they might have observed one if they had
included the most extreme prior probability conditions. In short,
our work shows that these previous findings of changes in LRP
amplitude can be reinterpreted as changes in DDM starting
points.
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Conclusion
We have shown evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the
LRP derives from the activity of threshold units in a neural
network implementation of the DDM. Our model provides a
neural mechanism for turning a continuous signal into a discrete
output. Because the threshold units lie in-between evidence
accumulation units and motor output units, LRPs exhibit both
an early signature of gradual evidence accumulation as well as a
later, ballistic, response-related (‘‘motor’’) component. An example
of evidence for the gradual-accumulation interpretation of the
LRP is that the area between curves from the low- and high-
coherence conditions correlates with individual differences in
behaviorally-estimated DDM parameters. Similarly, the height of
the LRP agrees with predictions of changes in response bias. We
therefore suggest that the LRP signals the process of crossing a
decision threshold, but also, because it provides an echo of the
process of evidence accumulation, that it can be used to study how




The experiments were approved by the Institutional Review
Board of Princeton University. The procedure included written
informed consent, which was provided by all participants.
Experiment 1
Model. Matlab code used to simulate the neural network
model that made the qualitative predictions is available in File S2.
Task. In this experiment (for which some of the data have
also been reported in [12]), we tested the model’s prediction that
manipulating stimulus coherence would change the area between
the LRP curves for low- and high coherence conditions.
Participants determined the motion direction of random dot
kinematograms. These random dot kinematograms were similar to
those used in a series of psychophysical and decision making
experiments involving humans and monkeys (e.g.,
[5,39,40,60,61]). Stimuli consisted of an aperture of approximately
7.6 cm diameter viewed from approximately 100 cm (approxi-
mately 4 degrees visual angle) in which white dots (262 pixels)
moved on a black background. A subset of dots moved coherently
either to the left or to the right on each trial, whereas the
remainder of dots were distractors that jumped randomly from
frame to frame. Motion coherence was defined as the percentage
of coherently moving dots. Dot density was 17 dots/square degree,
selected so that individual dots could not easily be tracked.
Tracking was further discouraged by using three interleaved sets of
dots of equal size, each of which was plotted in one of three
successive video frames. Therefore each set of dots returned after
three frames, with a random displacement. The speed of the dots
was approximately 7 degrees/second.
Following the procedure used in [40], stimuli remained visible
until participants made a response (i.e., pressing the ‘Z’ key with
their left index finger to indicate leftward motion or the ‘M’ key
with their right index finger to indicate rightward motion), at
which point the stimulus disappeared and a variable response-to-
stimulus interval (RSI) ensued. Correct responses were rewarded
with $0.01; errors were unrewarded. Sessions lasted a fixed
amount of time (50 minutes), so faster performance led to more
trials completed. Participants made on average $12.27 per session.
Reward feedback was displayed visually and signaled with a tone
after each trial. Participants were instructed to maximize their
earnings.
The arrows control condition was constructed as follows. Each
arrows trial started with random dot motion (0% coherence),
followed by the appearance of a clearly visible yellow arrow in the
center of the screen pointing in the direction to which a participant
should respond. The onset time of the arrow was calibrated such
that the duration of 0% coherence dots viewing time matched the
dot-viewing times in the main task. More concretely, the arrow
onset time distribution was created by subtracting the average
button-press latency (obtained from the signal detection control
task) from a randomly selected RT in the main task from the
previous session (this was done separately for each coherence). We
restricted our EEG analyses to the correct trials, because there are
many different reasons for making errors, which could introduce
noise in the model predictions and analyses.
The experiment presentation code was written in PsychToolbox
[62]. Dot stimuli were presented with PsychToolbox extensions
written by J. I. Gold (http://code.google.com/p/dotsx/).
Participants. Twenty-three members of the Princeton com-
munity (twelve female, mean age 25) participated in Experiment 1.
Participants engaged in three hour-long behavioral-only training
sessions in which they became familiar with the task. At the
beginning of these training sessions, performance on a psycho-
metric block (trials with fixed viewing times of 1000 ms and five
different coherences) was used to determine the coherences at
which they performed at approximately 70 and 90% correct.
These coherence levels were used for the remainder of the session,
and the coherences from the last psychometric block were used for
the two EEG sessions. Data of three participants, whose LRPs did
not show any modulation by movement, were removed from the
analysis.
Recording Methods. We recorded EEG data from 128
channels using Neuroscan EEG caps (Neuroscan, Charlotte, NC)
with a Sensorium EPA-6 amplifier (Sensorium Inc., Charlotte,
VT). Data were digitized at 1000 Hz and band-pass filtered from
0.02–300 Hz; all impedances ,30 kV. Acquisition was controlled
by Cogniscan software (EJC Systems Inc., Newfoundland, NJ). All
data were referenced to the left mastoid and off-line rereferenced
to an average reference after automatic bad-channel removal
[63,64].
Data Analysis. The LRP is thought to reflect the lateralized
aspect of the activity of primary motor cortex [46,47,65,66] and is
computed by subtracting the EEG in electrode C3 from electrode
C4 for left-handed responses, and C4 from C3 for right-handed
responses, and then averaging these differences [67]. Figure 3A,
which shows a topography of lateralized EEG activity, demon-
strates that C3 and C4 are indeed the maxima of lateralized
response activity.
We computed LRPs with 4-Hz low-pass filtered EEG data [35].
Note that the results with higher low-pass filter cut-offs are
qualitatively similar; importantly the correlations of aspects of the
LRPs with drift diffusion model parameters (discussed in more
detail below) are still significant (p,0.05) with a low-pass filter cut-
off of 40 Hz. Trials with eyeblinks (detected with a running
average of the eye channel exceeding 100 mV) were removed. We
also removed trials with signal amplitude larger than 70 mV, or
variance larger than 80 or smaller than 0.1 mV, or kurtosis larger
than 5 [68] from the analysis. Stimulus-locked LRPs were
baseline-corrected to the average over the 200 ms period
immediately preceding stimulus-onset. Response-locked LRPs
were baseline-corrected to the period of 400–600 ms pre-response
[35]. All LRP plots in this article are grand averages, i.e., averages
across all participants.
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We determined the LRP height for stimulus-locked LRPs by
computing the distance between the height of the LRP at its onset
and the peak (the first maximum before the RT). LRP onset was
defined by 1DF (1-degree-of-freedom) regression [69,70], and
verified by visual inspection. 1DF regression finds the intersection
between a line fitted to the stimulus onset (the initial segment) and
a line fitted to the LRP rise to peak. We constrained the slope of
the initial segment to be zero.
Model fits. We fit the DDM to the behavioral data for each
individual participant with the diffusion model analysis toolbox
(DMAT; [37,38]). As demonstrated by Bogacz [31], the DDM
closely approximates the accumulator layer of the neural network
model of Simen and Cohen [2]. DMAT captures individual
differences in drift rate, speed-accuracy trade-off and bias
sensitivity. These translate into testable predictions regarding
threshold unit dynamics that we examine here. The version of the
model we fit is the pure DDM [71], in which there is no variability
in drift rate, starting point, or non-decision time.
Experiment 2
The methods for this experiment were identical to those
described for Experiment 1, with the exception of the following.
Task. In this experiment, we used only a single coherence
level (corresponding to 80% correct performance), while we varied
response bias. Response bias was manipulated by changing the
probability that the dots would move in one of the two directions
from 0.5 (no bias) to 0.6, 0.75 and 0.9. We also manipulated
response-stimulus interval (RSI; see [40] for a review of the effects
of RSI and prior probability on behavioral performance in two-
alternative forced-choice tasks with response-terminated stimuli).
For the purposes of this analysis, we collapse across the two RSI
levels, which did not show any consistent differences in this
behavior. Also in this experiment we focused exclusively on the
correct trials, which was even more important than in Experiment
1, because the error rates differed between conditions.
Participants. Twenty-five members of the Princeton com-
munity participated in Experiment 2 (fifteen female, mean age
20.1). In this experiment, we adapted each participant’s motion
coherence during the practice sessions such that they performed at
approximately 80% correct. Participants were trained for four
hour-long behavioral sessions. Participants made on average
$16.02 per session.
Data Analysis. We determined the height of response-locked
LRPs by computing the distance between the last peak before the
response and the preceding trough. We verified the output of this
automated procedure by visual inspection. When we computed
the areas between curves we chose a time window identical to the
window used in Experiment 1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Mechanism for threshold crossing detection
predicted by the model’s threshold layer. (A) Small arrows
and shading depict the rate of change of a threshold unit’s
activation as a function of its current input and its own output.
Dark shading implies negative, light shading implies positive
velocity. Solid S-curve depicts stable equilibrium points of the
noise-free system; dashed segment of the S-curve depicts unstable
equilibria; dark circle depicts a typical initial condition. Arrows
depict the velocity of the system state, and are vertical because
input is constant. (B) Small vector field arrows show a rightward
component when input is positive and increasing. Large arrows
show the state trajectory: gradual increase in subthreshold region,
followed by rapid increase in the unstable region, resulting in the
rising phase shown in Figure 1B. (C) When threshold layer output
enters superthreshold region, response layer units abruptly
activate, supplying inhibition that forces the threshold unit back
down to its initial value (see Figure 1C).
(EPS)
Figure S2 Observed versus expected quantiles of the RT
distribution, illustrating model fit quality for Experi-
ment 1. A perfect fit would show all points on the unit slope line.
Different symbols reflect the different drift conditions.
(EPS)
Figure S3 Observed versus expected quantiles of the RT
distribution, demonstrating model fit quality of Exper-
iment 2. Shown are from left to right, top-to-bottom the 10th,
30th, 50th, 70th and 90th quantile. A perfect fit would show all
points on the unit slope line. Different symbols reflect the different
bias conditions.
(EPS)
Figure S4 Grand average stimulus-locked LRPs for
Experiment 1, emphasizing the difference between
integration and non-integration conditions occurring
close to stimulus appearance. Vertical lines indicate median
RT for each condition. Note that the LRP for the arrow trials
(green) rises only relatively late because the arrow that indicates
the response arrives after a period of dot motion. The arrow
arrival time is calibrated to create dot-viewing times equivalent to
the dot-motion trials.
(EPS)
Figure S5 Stimulus-locked LRPs and individual differ-
ences for Experiment 1. (A) Grand average LRP waveforms,
separated by coherence. Vertical lines indicates median RT for the
respective conditions. Shaded area indicates the time window for
computing the area between curves. The LRP rises more quickly
for high- than for low-coherence conditions. (B) Difference
between low- and high-coherence stimulus-locked LRP in the
window from 400–500 ms post-stimulus correlates with individual
differences in drift rate. Each dot reflects the difference between
low- and high-coherence LRP and drift rate for an individual.
(EPS)
File S1 Supplementary information. More detailed de-
scription of the model, stimulus-locked LRP data, and model fit
quality assessments.
(PDF)
File S2 Model code. Code to fit the neural network model of
decision making of Simen and Cohen (2009).
(ZIP)
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